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Abstract 
This paper makes the case for enhancing the economic and political integration of the entire wider 
European space with the EU, involving all those neighbouring states willing to subscribe to EU 
standards while at the same time facilitating the EU’s further enlargement in due course. This would 
also amount to a consolidation of Europe’s values, and act as a strategic marker to rebut Russia’s 
efforts to undermine those values.  
More specifically, the author advocates: 
- Upgrading the EU’s Association Agreements (AA) with East European states (Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine), with further content branded ‘AA+’; 
- Replacing the European Neighbourhood Policy with a Wider Europe policy concept;  
- Continuing the development of a multi-speed Europe which, with other EU reforms, could 
facilitate further enlargement of the EU when the conditions are met. 
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1. Introduction 
After some years of implementation of their AA/DCFTAs (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements), Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are looking for ways to inject renewed 
momentum into their aspirations to integrate with the EU. The EU’s refusal to extend 
membership perspectives to these three states is a disappointment to them, but leads to the 
search for other more open paths that might be useful for the time being.  
For the EU there is the need to clarify the strategic and geopolitical ambiguity it has created 
through its refusal to extend membership perspectives to these three states, given that Russia 
uses every opportunity to undermine their European orientations. Russia readily uses the 
argument ‘the EU does not really want you, but you would be entirely welcome to join the 
Eurasia Economic Union instead’.  
Both the EU’s enlargement strategy and neighbourhood policy are in disarray. Enlargement for 
the Balkan states advances so slowly, if at all, that its credibility as an incentive is eroded. The 
European Neighbourhood Policy, for its part, has fallen apart in both its southern and eastern 
branches, with the three AA/DCFTAs having emerged as its main positive legacy.  
Any further development of the AA/DCFTAs needs to take into account the changing context in 
the rest of the EU’s neighbourhood; namely the growing family of association agreements that 
have many common elements, including the European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland, the 
Balkans, Turkey, Brexit-UK, etc.   
Discussion within the EU around its further possible 
enlargements also links into longer-term ideas about a multi-
speed or multi-tier Europe. 
The renewal of the European Commission and Parliament in 
mid- to end-2019 is a propitious time to consider new policy 
ideas and specific proposals that the EU might take up from 2020 onwards.  
2. How history has moved on 
The original European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) dates back 15 years to 2003, when a 
Commission Communication1 proposed that: 
… the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood 
– a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative 
relations.  
                                                     
1 “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, 
COM(2003)104 final, 11 March. 
The renewal of the European 
Commission and Parliament in 
2019 is a propitious time to 
consider new policy ideas. 
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In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective 
implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in 
aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from 
the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU. To this end, Russia, the 
countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered 
the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and 
liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and 
capital (four freedoms).  
… the EU will examine the scope for new Neighbourhood Agreements to build on 
existing contractual relations. … If, however, the Neighbourhood Agreements 
contain provisions going beyond those of the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements, similar arrangements could be offered, on equivalent terms, to the 
Mediterranean partners. 
These quotations remind us how far developments have moved on over this period and serve 
as a hint that the years ahead might see further changes of comparable extent. For some 
commentators, the “ring of friends” has become more like a 
‘ring of fire’.  
As for the geography of the neighbourhood, Russia declined 
the invitation to join the European Neighbourhood Policy 
and instead proceeded to shape its own neighbourhood 
policy with the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 led to the South 
Caucasus states being invited to join the ENP, and the Eastern Partnership initiative of 2008 
embraced six post-Soviet states, without Russia.  
This was alongside a poorly conceived Union for the Mediterranean (which unsurprisingly failed 
to take off). To the south, realities diverged even further from the original idea, with the ‘Arab 
spring’ of 2011, sparked in Tunisia but spreading strongly to Libya, Egypt, and Syria, where the 
ensuing civil war eventually mutated into international war with the ISIS offensive. Only in 
Morocco and Tunisia did there emerge any prospect of following the AA/DCFTA model, but in 
neither case has this matured into new agreements.  
The ENP has thus disintegrated, a fact that the official doctrine of ‘differentiation’ can barely 
disguise. Its most positive legacy is the AA/DCFTA process established with Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine, which however suffers from strategic ambiguity; while all three countries seek full 
membership of the EU as their objective, the EU refuses to acknowledge this as a prospect even 
for the long term. 
The AA/DCFTA process also forms part of another ongoing and constructive process in the 
wider European neighbourhood, in which multiple EU policy instruments are being opened to 
participation by the large and growing set of associated states (EEA/EFTA, the Balkans, three 
For some commentators, the “ring 
of friends” has become more like a 
‘ring of fire’. 
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microstates,2 AA/DCFTAs, Turkey and potentially Brexit-UK). These instruments can deliver a 
degree of integration with the EU that increasingly approaches full membership in all respects 
bar political representation – to which we return below. 
3. What next for the AA/DCFTAs? 
3.1 Deepening sectoral policy collaboration  
The EU, with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia could review how to deepen the integration 
content of the AA/DCFTAs on a sector by sector basis, to pinpoint policy domains where: 
- there is provision only for vague cooperation that could be raised to an operationally 
significant level; or 
- detailed legal approximation commitments provide the basis for complementary 
operational activities that have been absent so far.  
To some degree this might correct the perception that the AA/DCFTAs are excessively focused 
on complex regulatory legislation, without delivering concrete results that are visible to the 
population.  
Ukraine has been advocating steps along these lines, initially with the intention to accede to 
several of the EU’s sectoral ‘unions’ – the customs union, energy union, digital union, and 
justice and home affairs. These ideas have been discussed but so far without concrete 
proposals.3  
The following are some examples of sectors that could see a deepening of operational 
collaboration. 
Customs cooperation. Ukraine has advanced the idea of acceding to the EU’s Customs Union. 
This could in principle further facilitate trade with seamless movement of goods across the 
border with the EU, and enhance investment in supply-chain linkages, as was seen with the 
EU’s enlargement into Central Europe. Tempting as this might sound as an evolutionary step 
beyond the DCFTAs, the idea encounters two key disadvantages. First, the acceding country 
would have to scrap any free trade agreements it has that the EU does not (for example for the 
AA/DCFTA states CIS free trade agreements with Eurasian Economic Union states). Second, the 
acceding state would have to apply the EU’s tariff preferences to its imports, without any legal 
assurance that the third countries would grant their counterpart tariff preferences to the new 
customs union participant. However, there is an important agenda for other ways to deepen 
customs cooperation with the EU, as indicated in Table 1, below (i.e. regarding preferential 
rules of origin, the EU’s customs code, authorised economic operators, etc.).   
                                                     
2 Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. 
3 They are all implicitly referred to in the joint press statement following the EU-Ukraine Association Council 
meeting on 17 December 2018, without however new commitments or recourse to ‘Union’ ideas.   
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Energy Union. The EU’s Energy Union programme focuses on boosting energy security, creating 
a fully integrated internal energy market, improving energy efficiency, decarbonising the 
economy, not least by using more renewable energy with EU funding to build a modern, 
interconnected energy grid across Europe, and further objectives for energy efficiency and 
renewable energies.4 Ukraine has taken a lead position in seeking to join the Energy Union, and 
discussions are ongoing. This could go way beyond the content of the AA/DCFTA, which 
concentrates on commitments to adopt EU energy law, as already covered through accession 
to the Energy Community treaty. An example of a new initiative from the EU side in September 
2017 is the Central and South-Eastern Europe Gas Connectivity (CESEC) programme, whose 
geographical scope was extended to cover the entire Western Balkans region, with focus on 
building an interconnected market for electricity and boosting investment in renewables and 
energy efficiency. This programme could be further extended to the AA/DCFTA states. The EU 
is already extending increased grant aid to support energy efficiency projects in Ukraine, 
alongside EBRD investments. There is already the plan to link the Ukrainian electricity grid to 
the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE). 
Transport Community. The AA/DCFTAs already have extensive commitments to adopt the EU’s 
transport regulatory rules for road, rail, and waterways, with provision also for Civil Aviation 
Agreements. Under the Eastern Partnership work is also underway to define priority corridors 
that can serve as extensions of the TEN-T networks.5  
For the Balkans, in 2017 the EU went further towards establishing a European Transport 
Community. This combines i) commitments to adopting the EU’s regulatory acquis in the 
transport field in a manner analogous to the Energy Community Treaty, with ii) detailed 
provisions for funding investment in transport infrastructures that extend the TEN-T network. 
The EU’s funding of its own transport networks is very substantial, with €26 billion worth of 
grants allocated under the budget for 2014-20. Recalling that the three EAA/DCFTA states 
acceded to the Energy Community treaty several years after it had been initiated in southeast 
Europe, one could envisage a similar accession to the European Transport treaty, given that the 
legislative approximation content of the AA/DCFTAs already go a long way towards fulfilling 
these requirements for the Transport Community (the Balkan states have many detailed 
transitional provisions before reaching full acquis compliance). The TEN-T action plan is mostly 
imprecise over financial commitments, which need to be finalised.  
Digital Single Market. In recent years the Commission has made the Digital Single Market a 
priority, and there are many fundamental developments underway. By comparison the content 
of the AA/DCFTA is thin, referring only to telecommunications legislation for approximation. 
How far and fast to follow through with what the EU is currently doing is therefore an issue for 
the AA/DCFTA process. A landmark legal act is the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which came into force only in May 2018 but seems to have become a new global 
                                                     
4 See the Commission’s latest progress report: “Third report on the State of the Energy Union”, November 2017. 
5 European Commission/Eastern Partnership, “Indicative TEN-T Investment Action Plan”, 2018. 
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standard. The question is whether the AA/DCFTA states will follow through on this. In addition, 
there is a far more extensive agenda to consider, for example the setting of a centralised 
spectrum policy for 5G as well as 4G; net neutrality rules; the free flow of data; intellectual 
property protection; the digitisation of public administrations; and an e-Privacy directive, etc. 
This is and will remain a fast-moving field, and the AA/DCFTA states may find it advantageous 
to connect with the EU’s comprehensive policy development already.  
Disinformation and cyber war. This topic has risen to the top of the EU’s security agenda, as a 
result of Russia’s self-proclaimed ‘information war’ aimed at the whole of Europe, including the 
EU and its member states, with Ukraine as the major frontline target. The EU is developing 
plans for its own cyber defence – the subject of wide public debate. A recent CEPS Task Force 
has reviewed possible options,6 which include setting up a cyber defence coordination 
mechanism and later a Cyber Defence Agency. The AA devotes only one short Article 7 to 
dialogue in the field of foreign and security cooperation; the information war and cyber 
defences are not even mentioned. Given the gravity and novelty of this security challenge, and 
the fact that Ukraine is Europe’s frontline in the face of Russian aggression, there is every 
reason for the EU’s development of new capabilities in this field to be undertaken in explicit 
collaboration with Ukraine.  
Criminal justice and police cooperation. The AA in Article 22 declares that the parties will 
“cooperate in combatting crime and illegal activities…”, but fails to say how this might be done 
in concrete terms. Ideas along these lines may be found in analyses of how the UK, post-Brexit, 
might cooperate with the EU in this field.7 Such ideas include cooperation with the European 
Arrest Warrant, the European Investigation Order and mutual recognition for freezing and 
confiscation orders. Also discussed are cooperation with the Europol and Eurojust agencies, 
and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and information-sharing tools with regard to EU 
databases. While the conceivable possibilities are thus quite substantial, such ideas are crucially 
dependent on establishing a high level of trust over the integrity and professionalism of 
partnering law enforcement agencies.  
Visa-free travel, asylum and safe countries of origin. All EEA/EFTA, Balkan and AA/DCFTA states 
now have visa-free travel possibilities in the Schengen area. This marks a great advance for the 
most recent beneficiaries of visa-free travel, but it is accompanied by some unwelcome 
increases in unjustified requests for asylum from Balkan and AA/DCFTA states, whose respect 
for human rights and the rule of law is in principle of a good standard. Asylum is virtually non-
existent, as between EU member states, the Lisbon Treaty having recognised (in Protocol 24) 
member states as “safe countries of origin”, in which asylum requests might only be declared 
admissible in the most exceptional and narrow of circumstances. In 2015 the Commission 
proposed extending this principle to Balkan states, but this proposal is still pending. However, 
                                                     
6 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer et al., “Strengthening the EU’s Cyber Defence Capabilities”, CEPS, 2018.  
7 Sergio Carrera et al., “Criminal Justice and Police Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit. Towards 
a principled and trust-based partnership”, CEPS, 2018. 
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as and when it is adopted it could also be extended at some point to the AA/DCFTA states. ‘Yes’ 
to visa-free travel combined with ‘no’ to asylum would be a fair system, given that visa-free 
travel is only agreed by the EU subject to serious rule of law conditions.   
3.2 Deepening institutional relationships   
The institutional setup under the AA/DCFTAs is well developed, with Association Councils and 
subordinate committees and working groups, and in the case of Ukraine provision for regular 
summits. The question is whether these arrangements could be further enhanced in the 
direction of deeper institutional integration. 
Government-to-Commission meetings. In a new move, seven cabinet ministers from Georgia 
accompanied the prime minister to meet with the plenary college of the European Commission. 
As well as attending a plenary session, the ministers divided into three clusters of topics, for 
further sessions with their counterparts in the European Commission.  
The most recent EU-Ukraine Association Council on 17 December 2018 saw a variant of this 
innovation. The Ukrainian side was headed by the prime minister, accompanied by several   
ministers. The joint statement commented explicitly on all the four sectoral headings 
advocated by Ukraine (see above), although the texts themselves barely go beyond advocating 
full implementation of the commitments already made in the AA/DCFTAs. However, the text 
also announced several complementary agreements on EU funding for energy-efficiency 
measures, people-to-people contacts and actions by the European Investment Bank. Quite an 
impressive illustration of actions to supplement the AA/DCFTAs. 
Three government-to-Commission meetings. A further variant could see the three AA/DCFTA 
states together meeting with the Commission. This might be done occasionally at summit level, 
or along the lines of the Georgian model, or a less complicated arrangement for individual 
sectoral policies (e.g. trade, energy, etc.) to be the subject of dialogue sessions between the 
relevant ministers and commissioners.   
Joining in informal meetings of the EU Council. At the level of the Council there is now a well- 
established practice between the EU and the three states of the European Economic Area 
(Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein), whereby for ‘informal’ meetings (i.e. non-legislative sessions 
devoted to policy debate) of the sectoral Councils of the EU the EEA, states may ask to 
participate in certain sessions. This happens with some regularity for Councils dealing with 
internal market, energy, competitiveness, environment, transport, defence, justice and home 
affairs, etc. The three AA/DCFTA states could conceivably build on this precedent, and together 
seek to join selected Council meetings where the agenda warranted it.  
European Parliament. The three AA/DCFTA states already have well-established relations with 
the European Parliament, which has ‘delegations’ to each. The Parliament also organises a 
South Caucasus delegation with all three states together. An alternative or additional initiative 
could be to organise a delegation for the three AA/DCFTA states together, since the common 
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ground between these three states now makes for a substantial agenda of policy issues, 
including the question of how the AA/DCFTA process should be further developed. 
Acceding to other institutional arrangements. A further quite different approach might see the 
AA/DCFTA states acceding to other European integration arrangements outside the EU, while 
remaining closely connected to it. There are two candidates for consideration here, as follows.  
Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA). This is basically a multilateral free trade area of all 
the Balkan states that are not yet in the EU, plus, interestingly for this paper, Moldova. CEFTA 
is a relatively simple free trade area, scrapping most tariffs and quantitative restrictions. It will 
soon conform to the revised Pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin, which will permit a 
diagonal cumulation of value added to meet requirements for tariff-free preferences. 
For Moldova this has the advantage of a simple single agreement to establish free trade 
relations with the whole of the Balkans, rather than the much more laborious process of making 
bilateral agreement with each member state. It may also be viewed as having the political 
quality of bringing Moldova more deeply into European integration, since all the Balkan states 
have the perspective of full EU membership. However, this quality is eroded by the EU itself, 
since in various technical CEFTA activities funded under pre-accession facilities, it has insisted 
that Moldova be excluded because it has not been granted a membership perspective. This 
restriction could easily be lifted if the EU chose to do so.  
Ukraine and Georgia could conceivably apply to accede to CEFTA with a view to obtaining the 
same advantages as Moldova, which would require the unanimity of CEFTA member states. As 
of now Ukraine has free trade agreements only with Macedonia and Montenegro among the 
CEFTA states, while Georgia has none.  
If Ukraine were to apply there would be concerns that this relatively large state, with a 
population more than twice all of CEFTA states together, could have an undue impact on the 
smooth workings of CEFTA. This possible objection would not apply to Georgia, whose 
population is around the size of the Balkan average. For Ukraine one might think of a different 
model, namely to make a multilateral free trade agreement between CEFTA and Ukraine as a 
non-CEFTA state. 
European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The AA/DCFTA states 
already have free trade agreements with EFTA, and the main direct consequence of acceding 
to EFTA itself (without the EEA) would be the obligation to apply EFTA’s existing set of free 
trade agreements with third countries. A more significant factor is that accession to EFTA is a 
legal prerequisite for accession to the EEA, which would be a far more consequential move for 
an AA/DCFTA state.  
The technical prerequisite for accession to the EEA would be a good implementation of all the 
legal approximation commitments made in the AA/DCFTA and other single market legislation 
not covered in the AA/DCFTA. The standards required, both in technical terms for the single 
market and in terms of good political practice, would be equivalent to that required for 
acceding as a full member state to the EU. The interest for the acceding state is that it would 
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be getting far closer to full EU membership, without being stopped by the absence of a 
membership perspective. It would position such a state well for full accession to the EU as soon 
as the political will on the part of the EU allowed it. Accession would still require the unanimity 
of all EU and EFTA/EEA states.  
Debate around the idea of the UK acceding to the EEA as a Brexit option revealed considerable 
hesitation on the part of Norwegian leaders about whether they would agree to this, with 
concern that the present stable functioning and reputation of the EEA might be undermined.  
Political and economic conditionality for AA+. From the above it is evident that there is much 
potential room to enhance the present AA/DCFTAs, allowing for supplements to the present 
texts that could be called AA+ for short and representing a 
step change for deeper integration with the EU. If the idea 
gained support one could envisage the EU setting out 
conditions for embarking upon a negotiation process to 
identify the operational content. Experience shows that 
‘conditionality’ is not an easy instrument to use effectively. 
It depends on a sound matching of interests and incentives. In recent years the conditionality 
attached to agreeing visa-free travel into the Schengen area, for example, seems to have been 
quite effective. For an AA+ a plausible scenario would be to check that all major commitments 
under the AA/DCFTA are being respected.  
To summarise …. for AA+. These upgraded agreements could be simpler legally, based on joint 
political declarations rather than treaties calling for ratification. If the broad idea were to be 
viewed favourably by the three AA/DCFTA states they could be well advised to develop such a 
position collectively, aiming at results with a consistent structure and content, but allowing for 
differences of detail or in transitional periods, where need be. The specific economic actions 
would have the most formal and operational content, while the political developments would 
be more informal. There are also some formal (but more problematic) institutional ideas, about 
possible accession to CEFTA or the EEA/EFTA.  
4. Replacing the European Neighbourhood Policy with a Wider Europe policy 
The geographic coherence of the original ENP has disintegrated and thus become obsolete.8 
The question is thus how the pieces might be reassembled in some other more plausible way, 
given that the current ‘differentiation’ discourse is hardly a 
persuasive solution.   
A key to answering this question may be found in the fact 
that just as the ENP was falling apart, the EU was enlarging 
the number of policy instruments that are made available to 
                                                     
8 See Steven Blockmans, The Obsolescence of the European Neighbourhood Policy, CEPS and Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2017. 
…there is potential room to enhance 
the present AA/DCFTAs, allowing 
for supplements to the present texts 
that could be called AA+. 
The geographic coherence of the 
original ENP has disintegrated and 
thus become obsolete. 
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most or all European non-member states, despite their differentiated political groupings. In 
fact, there are ongoing negotiations between the EU and its European neighbours, including 
EU-Switzerland negotiations over a new institutional framework; EU-Andorra/Monaco/San 
Marino negotiations over a new association agreement that would include the single market 
and customs union; EU-Turkish intentions to undertake ‘modernisation’ of the Customs Union; 
and the Brexit-UK. While the Balkan states are all actual or potential accession candidates, the 
content of their Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU now lags behind that of 
the AA/DCFTAs. 
The key point here is that despite the political heterogeneity of these various neighbouring 
states and groups thereof, the EU’s abiding concern is to retain coherence in the content of its 
external relations, especially in its close neighbourhood. This preference is revealed in the very 
substantial list of economic policy instruments that are open to participation by associated 
neighbouring states (as listed in Table 1 with appendices 1 and 2 detailing the agencies and 
programmes of the EU open to non-member states).  
Table 1. Instruments of EU economic policy available for neighbouring European states 
• Deep FTAs – various forms, EEA, SAA, DCFTA, Customs Union, 
• Technical standards 
- European Standards Organisations (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) 
- Sanitary and PhytoSanitary Regulations (SPS) 
- European Accreditation, Multilateral Agreements (EA-MLA) 
- Agreements for Conformity Assessment and Analysis (ACAA) 
- European Association of National Metrology Institutes (Euramet) 
• Customs cooperation 
- Union Customs Code (UCC) 
- Pan Euro-Med Convention for Preferential Rules of Origin and Diagonal Cumulation (PEM) 
- Common Transit Convention 
- New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) 
- Authorised Economic Operators (AEO) 
- Shared Border Crossing Points 
• Energy policy 
- Energy Community Treaty 
- Central and South Eastern European Connectivity network (CESEC) 
- European Network of transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE) 
• Transport policies 
- Transport Community Treaty 
- Pan-European Corridors 
- Trans-European Transport network (TEN-T) 
- European Civil Aviation Agreement (ECAA) 
- Civil Aviation Agreements (CAA) 
• Agencies of the EU – e.g. European Environmental Agency (see Annex 1) 
• Programmes of the EU – e.g. Horizon 2020, Erasmus+ (see Annex 2) 
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• Visa-free travel 
• EU Budget grants  
• European Investment Bank (EIB) 
• European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
This impressive list can be viewed as the basis of a de facto ‘wider European space’ in the 
making, even if no name is given to this development by the EU itself since its current doctrine 
adheres more to the political differentiation of the various groups. Nevertheless, there is a case 
for giving a more visible structure and name to this important reality, given both the demise of 
the ENP as originally conceived, and the strategic imperative for the EU to organise its wider 
neighbourhood more credibly and effectively in the face of Russian aggression. One might call 
this simply ‘Wider Europe’.  
To pursue this idea, a number of critical issues would need to be confronted.  
First, there is the question of whether such a Wider Europe initiative should be given an 
institutional and legal basis, and if so whether the existing groups of neighbouring states would 
want to share membership of it. Any formal institutionalisation of a Wider Europe would pose 
formidable legal issues, given the various legal bases that exist to the many operational 
instruments that would be in play. These are reasons why a hard institutionalisation of a Wider 
Europe would not be plausible. Furthermore, the EEA states would not want their privileged 
position as close and trusted partners of the EU to be diluted or destabilised in a wider 
grouping.  
Second, there is the issue of how far the instruments actually or potentially to be deployed in 
Wider Europe (such as in Table 1) should be harmonised in their application to all, or even 
formally multilateralised. In practice there is a range of types so far: only one case of formal 
and geographically comprehensive multilateralisation (PEM regime for rules of origin, with links 
to free trade agreements), some limited regional multilateralisation (Energy and Transport 
communities), and many more instances of bilateral accession or association in relation to 
specific instruments that have a standard EU basis. These practices provide a basis for the EU 
to review how far further to harmonise or generalise the external deployment of its relevant 
instruments, and also to maximise synergies with the operations of the European Investment 
Bank and EBRD. This would be a more plausible foundation for a Wider Europe.  
Third is the issue of regional integration. EU doctrine has so far advocated regional integration 
of groups of its neighbouring states rather than the much more ambitious integration of the 
entire EU-Wider Europe space. As regards the limited regional integration so far favoured, it is 
most plausible for the Balkans, given that they already share the CEFTA free trade area, and 
their existing Regional Cooperation Council is an active body. However, the idea of regional 
economic integration of the three AA/DCFTA states is not especially interesting: the big Ukraine 
has EU and global interests, Moldova is already party to CEFTA, and Georgia has wider 
ambitions as a hub and bridge between Europe and Asia. Prospects for regional integration in 
the South Mediterranean are even more remote, since the most progressive states have no 
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common land border. By contrast, regional economic integration of the entire EU-Wider 
Europe space could be the big prize.  
There is one instance where the Commission/EEAS has been considering a highly dubious 
move. It has proposed to integrate multiple existing financial instruments into a new 
Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). This would put 
the budgetary instrument for the AA/DCFTAs into a new global funding instrument that would 
predominantly serve programmes in Africa and other developing countries, whereas the 
Balkans would retain their separate pre-accession funding instrument. A decision on this point 
has been reserved for the new Commission. There are two reasons why this would be ill-
advised. First, the AA/DCFTA states already regard this proposal as a negative political signal, 
which would only be interpreted as underlining the 
ambiguity of the EU’s commitments to them. Second, 
functionally it would be incoherent. The context for the 
AA/DCFTA states is about the post-communist 
transition and European integration of states with 
good general levels of human capital; for Africa it is 
about basic development needs, as for developing 
countries in other continents. For the aid donor agency 
these are totally different challenges, and demand 
different operational concepts and methods. The management of aid to the AA/DCFTA states 
needs to be kept close to those responsible for policies for these countries, rather than placed 
as a small part of a much larger operation than is predominantly addressing the needs of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific developing countries. 
Eastern Partnership. The split between the AA/DDCFTA states and those joining the Eurasian 
Economic Union has of course made the task of giving significant profile to the Eastern 
Partnership more difficult. Ambitious objectives were nonetheless laid out in 2016 in a “20 
Deliverables for 2020” document, building on the elaborate structure of 4 multilateral 
platforms, and 12 panels. Next year, 2020, could be a better time to take stock in light of this 
experience, rather than the arbitrary 10th anniversary year, 2019. The Eastern Partnership 
retains the objective for the EU of developing the best possible relations with the three ‘other’ 
states, and of using the AA/DCFTA experience as something the ‘others’ may compare with the 
Eurasian Economic Union.  
‘People’ mechanisms such as education, culture and civil society activities are surely 
worthwhile and possible. The ‘Indicative TEN-T Investment Action Plan’ referred to above seeks 
to extend the EU’s internal transport networks to all six Eastern neighbours. The three specific 
bilateral relationships are important but different: with Armenia in the light of the new 
Enhanced Cooperation and Partnership Agreement; Azerbaijan in the light of ongoing 
negotiations for a new agreement; and Belarus in the context of Lukashenko’s continuing game 
of partially using the EU to sustain some independence from Russia.   
…the Commission/EEAS has been 
considering a highly dubious move, …. 
This would put the budgetary instrument 
for the AA/DCFTAs into a new global 
funding instrument that would 
predominantly serve programmes for 
Africa and other developing countries …. 
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Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’ economic space continues to 
feature in President Putin’s speeches, alongside suggestions that the EU and EAEU should make 
some kind of cooperation agreement. This idea could be attractive to the EU on economic 
grounds in the shape of a basic free trade agreement (leaving aside difficult political 
considerations) but is in practice excluded by Russia, given the priority it attaches to 
maintaining its deeply protectionist industrial policies. China has been willing to make a ‘non-
preferential’ agreement with the EAEU, i.e. excluding free trade, as a political gesture, but that 
is hardly a precedent for the EU to follow.   
The South Mediterranean. The original conception of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
included the idea that whatever might be offered to Eastern European states would also be 
offered to Southern Mediterranean neighbours. Realities since then have driven East and South 
into very different categories. To the South the so-called Arab spring that started in December 
2010 has led on into a landscape dominated by war in the broader Middle East and, more 
broadly, crisis conditions around the nexus of Islamic radicalisation, migration and asylum 
involving much of Africa as well. These are hugely important issues, and have logically to involve 
the Gulf as well as the Mediterranean, or the entire Arab world; but this extends beyond the 
scope of the present paper, or of the Wider Europe concept. Only in the cases of Morocco and 
Tunisia are there negotiations around the idea of AA/DCFTAs, but in neither case do these seem 
to progress. Nevertheless, the door must remain open to exploring close future relationships 
with these countries.  
The Western Balkans. The not-yet members of the EU in the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and – with its still uncertain status – Kosovo), all have in 
principle the prospect of acceding to the EU, albeit with differences in how far along the pre-
accession process they have travelled. Serbia and Montenegro are ranked as frontrunners by 
Brussels, with the possibility that they may soon be joined by Macedonia, now that its name 
dispute with Greece has finally been resolved. The Balkan states for their part would not 
support any initiative that could be interpreted as undermining their full membership 
perspectives; it would be understood that their pre-accession negotiations would continue, 
each on its own merits. Their realistic prospects for accession would be enhanced in the 
scenario for a multi-speed Europe (see the next section).  
To summarise, the existing European Neighbourhood Policy is obsolete, and could be replaced 
by a Wider Europe policy. This would aim at the maximum feasible economic and political 
integration, short of EU membership, of the entire region consisting of the EU itself with all 
European states willing to adopt EU technical standards and market regulatory policies, and to 
support European political values. Individual accession procedures for states concerned would 
also continue, and would be entirely consistent with the content of the Wider Europe policy. 
Cooperative policies on a more modest scale would also be sustained with other neighbouring 
states in Eastern Europe and North Africa.  
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5. Multi-speed Europe and enlargement policy  
For many years there has been debate about a ‘multi-speed’, or ‘multi-tier’, or ‘variable 
geometry’ Europe with ‘differentiated integration’. Such ideas express the interest of countries 
that have the will to integrate deeper and faster than others, leaving the latter to follow 
whenever they might be ready and willing to do so. The most prominent early proposal was 
that of Schaeuble and Lamers in 1994.9 For an early academic account of the proliferation of 
terms seeking to capture the same broad idea, see Alexander Stubb’s paper of 1996.10 The 
semantic proliferation is itself testimony to the inherent difficulties in formulating an 
operational proposition along these lines in the practical context of EU institutions and law.  
While the motivation is usually to favour deeper top-level integration, there can also be the 
opposite case for favouring wider lower-level integration, i.e. facilitating enlargement of a basic 
EU. Both motives and tendencies can coexist, and this approach would be the most relevant 
for the purposes of the present paper. The dual approach might thus see a simultaneous 
process of a deepening top-level integration and widening at a more basic lower level.  
Proposals are sometimes given a clear constitutional focus, for example under the heading of 
a federal Europe. This idea has a long lineage from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s text of 1926,11 
to the early post-war European federalists such as Altiero Spinelli, whose name also inspired 
the more recent informal ‘Spinelli Group’ that was initiated in 2010 to promote federal ideas.  
It has to be said that the federal idea as a general constitutional proposition is no longer 
favoured in many member states, and even some of the founding member states rule it out 
(e.g. the Netherlands and more recently Italy). Some advocates of the federal idea would see 
this as a top-level Europe above a lower-level basic Union, but how the two might be organised 
in terms of competences has never been clear, and indeed is certainly problematic.  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there are actual tendencies at work that could be heading 
towards the dual deepening and widening approach.  
There is a real movement towards deepened integration 
with limited member state participation in the important 
euro and Schengen areas, as well as emerging proposals 
for foreign policy and defence cooperation – see Box 1 for 
details. These are ad hoc, sector-specific initiatives, driven 
by concrete needs and possibilities in each case, rather than a broader systemic or 
constitutional design. Yet all three sectors are of strategic political significance. They result in 
complex legal and institutional relationships within or alongside EU law and institutions. 
                                                     
9 Wolfgang Schaeuble and Karl Lamers, “Reflections on European Policy”, CDU/CSU Group at the Bundestag, 1994.  
10 Alexander Stubb, “A categorization of Differentiated Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 4, 
No. 2, June 1996. The author, then a student, has since become prime minister of Finland and is now a candidate 
for the presidency of the Commission. 
11 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926.  
…there are actual tendencies at 
work that could be heading 
towards the dual deepening and 
widening approach. 
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Nonetheless, in all three cases legal and institutional arrangements have been found to enable 
these sectoral policies to advance without wrecking the basic EU, which increasingly revolves 
around a broad single market and regulatory space, coupled to commitment to democratic 
political values. However, the three restricted membership activities all have somewhat 
different membership maps; 19 countries for the euro area; 26 for the Schengen area (of which 
22 are EU member states and 4 are the EFTA non-member states); and 25 for the PESCO 
(Permanent Structured Cooperation) defence mechanism. The member states that are present 
in all these three restricted clubs may be viewed as a de facto core top-tier Europe.  
Box 1. Deepening developments in the European monetary, Schengen and defence sectors 
Deepening the euro area system. The euro area currently includes 19 EU member states. The 2008 
financial crisis has led to progressive development and use of the euro area’s financial mechanisms. The 
most clear-cut examples are the Banking Union, resulting in the creation of stronger regulatory 
instruments, notably the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and Single Resolution Fund (SRF). In 
addition, the euro area’s means of raising capital to support principally the euro area member states 
has been built up with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). There is a proposal for a European 
Deposit Scheme (EDIS), which has encountered opposition. More promising is the proposal for a euro 
area budget line to protect against economic shocks. This was proposed by President Macron, and after 
some months of debate has been accepted in principle by euro area leaders. There are complex 
relationships between these instruments and the EU institutions, and the ESM in particular is managed 
outside the Commission but on the basis of EU law and open to any member state, while the proposed 
euro area budget is planned to form part of the EU budget but to benefit euro area states only. 
Deepening Schengen area cooperation. The Schengen area (26 countries) for movement across frontiers 
without controls has a complex differentiated geography, with the island member states (UK, Ireland 
and Cyprus) opting out, and the most recently acceding states not yet admitted (Romania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia), while the four EFTA states are included (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland). The 
criteria for accession to Schengen are exacting with regard to the rule of law and border security. In 
addition, the migration and terrorism crises of recent years have led to major legislative and policy 
developments of the Schengen area in the fields of migration and asylum, with related issues of 
refugees, legal and illegal entry, readmission, criminal and justice cooperation that are sometimes 
specific to the Schengen area sometimes applying to the whole EU.12 The Commission tries to keep this 
whole policy landscape anchored in EU law and institutions, but there is a complex mix of Schengen-
only activity, core EU activity, and ad hoc intergovernmental agreements in play.    
Deepening defence activity. Proposals to enhance the EU’s embryonic defence capabilities must 
constantly face the question of whether they are to be applied by all EU member states, given that some 
are not NATO members. Some espouse various graduations of neutrality, and many have very minor 
military capabilities.13 While some initiatives, such as defence procurement, may be developed at the 
                                                     
12 For a detailed account see Sergio Carrera, “An Appraisal of the European Commission of Crisis – Has the Juncker 
Commission delivered a new start for EU Justice and Home affairs?”, CEPS, 2018. 
13 For a detailed account see Steven Blockmans, “The EU’s Modular Approach to Defence Integration: an inclusive, 
ambitious and legally-binding PESCO?”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, pp. 1785-1826, 2018. 
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full EU level, when it comes to mechanisms for actual military operations there will be more limited 
participation. The most recent initiative for PESCO, launched in 2017, which will involve “willing Member 
States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, and which have made more binding commitments 
to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions” (Article 42 (6) TFEU). It was 
decided in November 2017 that 25 member states would be party to PESCO.  
The idea of merging these three sectors and possibly other initiatives into a legally and 
institutionally unified ‘top-tier Europe’, on top of a basic European Union for other 
competences, meets major objections, however. First, the membership maps of the three 
restricted sectors (euro, Schengen, defence) are all different. Second, not even all the founding 
six member states, long presumed to be the core, would respond positively (as pointed out 
above regarding the Netherlands and today’s Italy). Third, many of the states acceding in or 
since 2005, and older member states not currently in any or all of the three restricted sectors, 
would not want to be relegated to a second tier in any systematic way. The multi-speed idea is 
much more palatable than the multi-tier idea: the former being open to all in due course, 
whereas the latter sounds like permanent discrimination.  
Nonetheless, the current momentum in favour of pragmatic and selective deepening of the 
three sectors is itself an impressive systemic development, which has managed to get around 
the problems listed above that would impede a more formalised and unified top tier. This links 
to statements by President Macron to the effect that before any future enlargement of the EU 
there should first be institutional reform of the EU itself. The nature of such reforms is not yet 
evident. However, some well-known ideas could fit in here, such as a reduction of the number 
of Commissioners (as envisaged for what became the Lisbon Treaty, but jettisoned in order to 
secure Ireland’s ratification), and further extension of qualified majority voting. Taxation and 
foreign policy are two domains discussed, if hardly a matter of consensus at present, for the 
possible extension of QMV. The Lisbon Treaty included, in Article 16, a reform of the QMV 
voting formula that could help to ease problems associated 
with the expansion of the number of small member states, 
namely its inclusion of a population weight.14 The Lisbon 
Treaty also includes the so-called ‘passarelle’ Article 48, 
which allows for a simplified treaty revision procedure in 
some areas.  
Taken together with the ongoing deepening of the three sectors, such reforms could be seen 
as easing the way towards further enlargement for those states that want membership and will 
have already progressed in adopting EU single market regulatory policies and also of course in 
respecting EU political values. In other words, one could envisage a basic EU based on the single 
market and the institutions whose membership may be widened, without impeding deeper 
development of the three strategic sectors with limited membership for the time being, these 
                                                     
14 A qualified majority requires 55% majority of countries: 55% (comprising at least 16 of them), or 72% if acting 
on a proposal from neither the Commission nor the High Representative, and a 65% majority of the population. 
…the current momentum in favour 
of pragmatic and selective 
deepening of the three sectors is 
itself an impressive systemic 
development. 
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sectors still being anchored on EU law. This is a greatly simplifying schema, since there are in 
practice may detailed legal provisions and instruments that blur the boundaries in the three 
sectors between restricted and EU plenary activity. Yet here there is a broad idea for enabling 
deepening and widening in parallel. 
To summarise, there are important ongoing systemic 
developments in three sectors of a multi-speed Europe 
which, taken together with some institutional reforms of the 
basic EU, could facilitate its further enlargement in the 
longer term.  
Conclusions 
Of the several categories of hypothetical action discussed, the first and most limited would 
concern the AA/DCFTA states, and see a deepening of sectoral policy collaboration, 
complementing and building on the existing provisions of the AA/DCFTAs, and complemented 
by a deepening, also of institutional relationships. Together these developments might be 
dubbed AA+, and would be set out first in a consultative document by the Commission/EEAS 
for dialogue with the partner states, leading to a series of AA+ agreements.  
Yet this would not deal with the wider problem of the obsolescence of the EU’s neighbourhood 
policy, alongside the growing reality that the EU deploys an increasingly impressive and 
common array of policy instruments to all its European neighbours that share association 
agreements with it. This invites development of a new neighbourhood policy concept, which 
might be called a ‘Wider Europe’ policy. This would embrace all countries willing to adopt or 
approximate EU single market regulations and support EU political values – albeit with some 
seeking accession and others not. This Wider Europe policy would be based on the range of 
common instruments of EU policy that can be applied by non-member states.  
The AA+ could be a stand-alone initiative, but would optimally be developed alongside and as 
part of a Wider Europe policy. The existing AA/DCFTAs and even more so the AA+ have features 
relevant for other existing or possible association agreements, for example the Balkan (SAA) 
association agreements.  
The economic integration of this vast European space has an 
economic rationale going way beyond that of limited regional 
integration arrangements. Its political significance is 
heightened by the need to respond strategically to external 
threats, notably from Russia.  
Articulation of a Wider Europe policy could be prepared by the Commission/EEAS with a Green 
Paper for consultation within the EU and with neighbouring states. Detailed questions of 
possible degrees of harmonisation of specific instruments of policy, including possible degrees 
of multilateralisation, would need to be addressed in detail. 
…such reforms could be seen as 
easing the way towards further 
enlargement. 
The economic integration of this 
vast European space has an 
economic rationale going way 
beyond that of limited regional 
integration arrangements. 
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The Wider Europe policy would also aim to achieve the most constructive possible relations 
with other outer groups, including the other Eastern Partnership states (notably those now 
members of the Eurasian Economic Union), and North Africa. 
These issues lead further into questions about the EU’s currently stagnating enlargement 
policy, whose resolution might be facilitated by ideas for further developing a multi-speed 
Europe. Simple talk of a federal Europe, to lie in some way on top of a basic EU, has not been 
translated into operationally plausible proposals, and understandably so because of 
fundamental difficulties that would have to be confronted. However, combined with some 
limited EU institutional reforms, a continued deepening of the three policy domains already 
subject to limited participation (euro, Schengen, defence) might ease the perceived constraints 
on further enlargement to the basic EU of the single market, for which the associated states 
can become well prepared.  
To summarise, the conclusions favour: 
- Upgrading of the AA/DCFTAs, with further sectoral policy and institutional content, 
branded AA+; 
- Replacement of the European Neighbourhood Policy by a ‘Wider Europe’ policy;  
- Development of multi-speed Europe, which with other EU reforms could facilitate 
further enlargement into the basic EU in the longer term.  
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Appendix 1. EU agencies open to non-member states 
European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work 
(EU-OSHA) 
European Defence Agency (EDA) 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA) 
European Police College (CEPOL) 
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) 
European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(EUISS) 
European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit 
(EUROJUST) 
European Police Office (EUROPOL) 
European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
(FRONTEX) 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) 
European GNSS Agency (GSA) 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) 
European Environment Agency (EEA) 
European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) 
European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND) 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. EU programmes open to neighbouring non-member states 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
Copernicus, European Earth Observation 
Programme 
Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs 
(COSME) 
Creative Europe, Programme for the cultural 
and creative sectors 
Customs 2020  
Erasmus+ 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
European Statistical Programme 
European Territorial Cooperation 
Fiscalis 2020 (tax administration support) 
Galileo and EGNOS Programmes, Global satellite 
navigation system 
Health for Growth 
Hercules III Anti-fraud Programme 
Horizon 2020 Internal Security Fund 
Life Programme, Environment and climate 
change 
Pericles 2020, Programme for the protection of 
the euro against counterfeiting 
SESAR JU, Air Traffic Management 
modernisation 
European Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
 
